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STATE IMMUNITY AND THE PATENT
TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
TEJAS N. NARECHANIA*
INTRODUCTION
Since Congress’s enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
the power and influence of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) as
an adjunct to (or substitute for) patent litigation has steadily grown. And just
as the PTAB and district courts both face difficult questions of substantive
patent law, many of the difficult jurisdictional and procedural issues that
have presented in district court litigation have found counterparts in the
PTAB, too. One category of such challenges regards the power of the PTAB
to hear claims involving other governmental entities. The interactions among
private patent rights, the federal patent power, and other sovereign interests
present a series of interesting questions. For example, how may federal
agencies defend against suits alleging infringement by the government?1 Are
Indian tribes immune from the power of the PTAB?2 Are the fifty states?3
In this invited symposium contribution, I consider that latter question:
Are the states immune from the power of the PTAB? This question—like the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. For their
generous comments, suggestions, and conversations, I thank Easha Anand, Sonia Katyal, Mark Lemley,
Jonathan Masur, Khushali Narechania, Arti Rai, and Greg Reilly. I also thank the diligent and careful
editors of the Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property.
1. Compare, e.g., Motorola Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768–69, 768 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(describing some remedies that are not available in suits against the federal government), with Return
Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 139 S. Ct. 397 (2018) (mem.) (granting certiorari to decide whether
federal agencies may petition for patent review in the PTAB).
2. Compare, e.g., Specialty House of Creation, Inc. v. Quapaw Tribe, No. 10-CV-371-GKF-TLW,
2011 WL 308903, at *1–2 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 27, 2011) (the district court’s jurisdiction does not encompass
patent claims against the Quapaw Tribe), with Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d
1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (the PTAB’s jurisdiction does encompass proceedings against the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe).
3. Compare, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
647–48 (1999) (the federal courts’ jurisdiction does not encompass patent infringement claims against
the states), with Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Mo., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563, at *2
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (the PTAB’s jurisdiction may encompass proceedings against the states).
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question of tribal immunity from PTAB jurisdiction—may be exceptionally
consequential. Sovereign immunity from post-issuance patent review can
confer important advantages on states and tribes for reasons that are entirely
untethered to innovation policy. There is no evident reason, for example, that
a state university’s patents should be relatively more valuable than those
issued to a comparable private university. But immunity confers such value.4
Moreover, sovereign entities may lease their immunity to private patent
owners in order to shield their patents from review.5 Indeed, Mylan
Pharmaceuticals accused Allergan and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe of
employing exactly such a scheme.6 And though the Supreme Court recently
declined to review a decision denying immunity to the Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe under those circumstances,7 other cases—including cases implicating
the states’ immunity—continue to percolate.8
So can the states shield their patents from post-issuance review? I
conclude that they cannot. State sovereign immunity jurisprudence suggests
at least three reasons why this is so.
First, state sovereign immunity is primarily a limit on the federal
government’s “judicial power” under Article III of the Constitution. But the
Supreme Court has explained that the PTAB does not—indeed, it could
not—exercise such Article III power when it reconsiders a decision to grant
a patent.9
Second, though state immunity generally applies to exercises of Article
III power, the Supreme Court has explained that the Eleventh Amendment’s
penumbras may shield states from other federal proceedings—say, agency
proceedings—that closely resemble an ordinary lawsuit.10 But inter partes
review at the PTAB differs from ordinary litigation in several significant,

4. Tejas N. Narechania, An Offensive Weapon?: An Empirical Analysis of the ‘Sword’ of State
Sovereign Immunity in State-Owned Patents, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1574, 1602 (2010) (suggesting that
state universities have been able to “become more aggressive licensors of their patents” vis-à-vis their
private counterparts).
5. See, e.g., Cecilia (Yixi) Cheng & Theodore T. Lee, When Patents are Sovereigns: The
Competitive Harms of Leasing Tribal Immunity, 127 YALE L.J. F. 848, 850 (2018) (explaining that such
leases may “allow the [patent-holder] to maintain a dominant market position to the detriment of
competitors and consumers”).
6. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2–
4 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
7. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 18-899, 2019 WL 1590253, at *1 (U.S.
Apr. 15, 2019) (mem.).
8. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., No. 2018-1559 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 12, 2018).
9. See Oil States Energy Serv. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373–75 (2018).
10. E.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760–61 (2002).
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relevant respects.11 District courts, for example, generally lack discretion to
refuse a plaintiff’s complaint.12 Not so in inter partes review: The Patent
Office has the unreviewable discretion to deny any petition for review.13
This particular distinction—that the Patent Office may itself decide
whether to institute review—suggests a third, and perhaps more novel, basis
for subjecting states to the PTAB’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly affirmed the federal government’s power to sue the states to
protect federal interests.14 And the federal government has a clear,
compelling interest in ensuring that public rights, such as patents, “are kept
within their legitimate scope.”15 Hence, because inter partes review is
“designed to end [the] continuing violation of federal law” wrought by an
wrongly-issued patent, the Patent Office may decide, in its own discretion,
to institute review of a state-owned patent, state immunity notwithstanding.16
Such review “vindicate[s] the federal interest,” both in “assuring the
supremacy of that law,” and in restoring parity between public and private
patentees.17
This article proceeds in three parts.
I begin with a brief survey of the states’ claims to immunity in patent
settings. While the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid has largely
kept the states out of federal court on patent claims,18 the PTAB’s state
immunity decisions are far less consistent, yielding at least four distinct
theories of immunity.19 In some cases, the PTAB has concluded that
sovereign immunity shields, absolutely, state-owned patents from post-grant
review. But this view may, as noted, both distort patent-related markets and
create an undesirable market for sovereign immunity. In other cases, the
PTAB has concluded that a state’s immunity is contingent on its conduct in
other fora. But this approach requires putative petitioners to wait to be sued
before petitioning for review. In other cases, the PTAB has concluded that
while the states may not be haled before the Board, their co-patentees may
11. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016); see also Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1326–29 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
12. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 757, 763–64.
13. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2139–40.
14. E.g., United States v. Minn., 270 U.S. 181, 195 (1926); see also Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S.
at 767–68.
15. Oil States Energy Serv. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373–75 (2018) (quoting
Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144).
16. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
17. See id.
18. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647–48 (1999).
19. See infra notes 42–57 and accompanying text.
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be. And in the final class of cases, members of the PTAB have concluded
that state sovereign immunity should never apply to the Board’s proceedings.
But both of these latter approaches threaten the states’ fiscal interests, and
may, in the states’ view, constitute a constitutionally “impermissible affront”
to the states’ sovereign dignity.20
In view of these doctrinal difficulties, I take a fresh look at the states’
claim to immunity from the PTAB’s jurisdiction. I conclude that the Patent
Office Director’s power to institute inter partes review includes the power to
institute review of a state-owned patent (no less than any privately-owned
patent). This is so for the three primary, doctrinal reasons described above.
One, state sovereign immunity operates primarily as a limit on the federal
government’s “judicial power”—a power the PTAB cannot exercise.21 Two,
the states’ immunity does not apply to administrative proceedings that, like
inter partes review, do not “walk[], talk[], and squawk[]” like ordinary
litigation.22 Three, the federal government retains the power to check, via
agency process, the lawfulness of public rights granted to the states.23
Finally, I explore the policy concerns that attend to immunity from
challenges to state-owned patents. I explain that these challenges are rather
far afield from the core concerns of sovereign immunity. Instead, such
immunity operates to give states an undue advantage in its role as market
participant (rather than sovereign governor).24 States, for example, have
deployed their immunity to avoid ownership challenges and validity
challenges, and have thereby “become more aggressive licensors of their
patents.”25 But in other sovereign immunity contexts, Congress has
eliminated these undue advantages. Hence, the government’s power to check
state-owned patents through inter partes review helps assure a better balance
between public and private patentees.

20. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 766–67 (2002).
21. U.S. CONST., Art III., § 1.
22. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 751.
23. See infra notes 102–129 and accompanying text.
24. Cf. Thacker v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 139 S. Ct. 1435, 1442–43 (2019) (noting that the Court had
previously reasoned that “the liability of the Postal Service. . .should be similar to that of other selfsustaining commercial ventures”).
25. Narechania, supra note 4, at 1602.
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STATE IMMUNITY IN PATENT PROCEEDINGS
Immunity from Judicial Process
The modern history of state sovereign immunity in intellectual property
settings begins with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Chew v. California.26
In Chew, the Federal Circuit concluded that though Congress might abrogate
the states’ immunity from federal patent litigation, the Patent Act lacked the
“requisite unmistakable language of congressional intent necessary to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.”27 Because the Patent Act failed
this clear statement test, the states were “immune from suit for patent
infringement.”28
Congress responded quickly to Chew: Finding that state immunity from
suit “cuts against [the Intellectual Property clause] of the U.S. Constitution”
because it “effectively discourages future innovati[ons],” Congress amended
the patent, copyright, and trademark statutes “to clarify that states are
monetarily liable” for the infringement of intellectual property rights.29
These bills stated, in unmistakably clear language, that infringement liability
extends to “any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or
employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official
capacity.”30
The Supreme Court would eventually take a closer look at these new
provisions. Both the Federal Circuit (in Chew) and Congress (by amending
various intellectual property statutes) assumed that Congress could abrogate
the states’ immunity under its Intellectual Property and Commerce Clause
powers.31 But an intervening decision—Seminole Tribe v. Florida—seemed
26. Chew v. Cal., 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
This summary of the “modern history of state sovereign immunity” from judicial process is
adapted from my previous work, Tejas N. Narechania, An Offensive Weapon?: An Empirical Analysis of
the ‘Sword’ of State Sovereign Immunity in State-Owned Patents, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1574 (2010).
27. Chew, 893 F.2d at 334.
28. Id. at 336.
29. See, respectively, S. REP. NO. 102-280, at 8 (1992); id.; and H.R. REP. NO. 101-960, pt. 1, at 2
(1990).
30. See Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992),
invalidated by Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999);
Patent and Plant Variety Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992),
invalidated by Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999);
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990), invalidated by Chavez
v. Arte Pub. Press, 204 F.3d 601, 608 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding CRCA was “doomed in the wake of Florida
Prepaid”).
31. See, respectively, e.g., Chew, 893 F.2d at 334; and Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. at 635.
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to call that assumption into question.32 And, in a subsequent pair of
companion cases—Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank and College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid—the Court held that these Article I powers
did not empower Congress to abrogate the states’ immunity and thereby hold
them liable for intellectual property infringement.33
Hence, following the Florida Prepaid decisions, the states were
immune from federal litigation alleging violations of private intellectual
property rights. And the Federal Circuit extended this immunity to
encompass a range of suits and violations. In Xechem, for instance, the
Federal Circuit held a state university immune from an ownership challenge
regarding a patent that had allegedly been co-developed by a Xechem
scientist and a state university researcher.34 Likewise, in Tegic
Communications, that court held another state university immune from a
declaratory judgment challenge to a state-owned patent.35 This was so even
though the state university had filed a related infringement lawsuit in another
federal district court.36
To be sure, the states’ immunity from federal judicial process is not
absolute. They may, for example, waive their immunity. In Vas-Cath v.
University of Missouri, the state university initiated an administrative
interference proceeding before the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (the PTAB’s predecessor).37 The University of Missouri
prevailed before the agency, and when Vas-Cath appealed the agency’s
decision, the district court dismissed the appeal on sovereign immunity
grounds.38 But the Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that Missouri waived
immunity by commencing the administrative proceeding.39 Because
Missouri waived immunity before the agency, the Federal Circuit concluded
that would be impermissibly unfair to allow the state to “retain the fruits of
[the original administrative] action and bar the losing party from its statutory
right of review.”40 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Lapides v. Board of Regents
32. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
33. Respectively, Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 635–36, 647–48;
Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 672.
34. Xechem Int’l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
35. Tegic Commc’ns Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
36. Id. at 1337, 1344.
37. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
38. Id. at 1379–80.
39. Id. at 1382.
40. Id. at 1385.
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of the University System of Georgia denounced a similarly “selective use of
immunity to achieve litigation advantages.”41
Immunity from Administrative Process
States, then, can waive immunity from judicial process by participating
in agency proceedings. And they can waive immunity from administrative
process, too—say, by voluntarily filing an agency petition. But, beyond this
simple scenario, the scope of the states’ immunity from the PTAB’s
jurisdiction remains uncertain.
Consider several recent PTAB adjudications, many of which advance
conflicting conclusions regarding the scope of the states’ immunity.
In the first such proceeding, a state university sued Covidien, alleging
a breach of a license arrangement.42 Covidien’s strategy in response included
a counterclaim of invalidity, removal to federal court, and several petitions
for inter partes review before the PTAB.43
The PTAB’s decision in Covidien begins with Federal Maritime
Communication v. South Carolina State Ports Authority (“FMC”), the
Supreme Court’s leading account of the scope of state immunity from agency
process.44 The short answer—elaborated in more detail infra—is that states
are immune from agency proceedings that “walk[], talk[], and squawk[]” like
ordinary litigation in the federal district courts.45
The Covidien panel determined that inter partes review proceedings at
the PTAB satisfied FMC’s standard for immunity.46 In the view of the
Covidien panel, “the considerable resemblance between” inter partes review
and ordinary litigation was “sufficient to implicate the [states’] immunity.”47
In particular, the Board explained that the similarities in the adversarial
nature of the proceeding, the role of the adjudicator, and the governing rules
all meant that state immunity applied.48 Other PTAB decisions reach like
conclusions. In NeoChord, for example, the panel similarly concluded that a

41. See id. at 1383 (quoting Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
42. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., No. IPR2016-01274, No. IPR2016-01275, No.
IPR2016-01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017).
43. Id.
44. Id. at *2 (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753–61 (2002)).
45. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 751.
46. Covidien LP, 2017 WL 4015009, at *12.
47. Id. at *11.
48. Id. at *9–11.
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state respondent was immune from inter partes review given the apparent
similarities between the agency’s proceeding and district court litigation.49
So too in Reactive Surfaces—though, there, the agency’s proceeding
remained active because of a non-sovereign co-owner.50 That is, the PTAB
could keep the state-owned patent under review, so long as a non-state coowner remained subject to the Board’s jurisdiction. Hence, though the state
escaped the burdens of agency process, the state’s interest in the patent
remained under threat.
In Covidien and NeoChord, the PTAB terminated proceedings
challenging state-owned patents in view of the states’ immunity. And in
Reactive Surfaces, the PTAB held the state patent owner immune from the
agency’s jurisdiction—though the challenge to the patent (and, hence, to the
state’s fiscal interest) remained active in view of its non-state co-owners.
At least one other PTAB panel has taken an even narrower view of the
states’ immunity from the power of the Board.
In Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of University of Missouri, the panel majority
explained state sovereign immunity may apply to the PTAB’s proceedings.51
But, there, the state waived immunity by first filing an infringement suit in
district court.52 That is, notwithstanding cases like Tegic—holding that a
state’s participation in one matter cannot be understood as waiving immunity
in a different (even if related) proceeding—the Ericsson panel concluded that
immunity does not apply where the petitioner has been sued by the state for
infringement.53 Instead, the panel reasoned that a petition for inter partes
review more closely resembled a compulsory counterclaim in the same
action, rather than a complaint in a wholly different proceeding: Both must
be brought in response to the initial complaint, or never brought at all.54 And
since immunity is deemed waived as to compulsory counterclaims, so too
with inter partes review.55

49. NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Balt., No. IPR2016-00208, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at
*31 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017).
50. Reactive Surfaces v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, 2017 WL 2992429, at *7
(P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017).
51. Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Mo., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563, at *2
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017).
52. Id. at *3–4.
53. Id.
54. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a), with 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
55. Ericsson Inc., 2017 WL 6517563, at *4; see also Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d
1111, 1125–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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Judge Bisk concurred, suggesting that state immunity should never
apply to inter partes review.56 In her view, several features of the Board’s
power and process “differentiat[e] inter partes review from civil litigation,”
including the proceeding’s basic purpose as a check on an examiner’s initial
decision to grant a patent application, the petitioner’s available remedies, and
the PTAB’s jurisdiction to conclude the proceeding even where the original
parties have settled the matter privately.57
Hence, different members of the PTAB have advanced at least four
different views about the scope of state immunity before that Board. Cases
like Covidien suggest that the similarities between the Board’s proceedings
and ordinary litigation mean that immunity applies, full stop. In contrast,
Judge Bisk’s concurrence implies that the differences between inter partes
review and district court proceedings mean that immunity never applies.
Meanwhile, other opinions attempt to chart a middle ground. The panel
majority in Ericsson, for example, suggests that immunity may apply, except
where the state has waived its immunity through its conduct in other fora.
And Reactive Surfaces shields the state from the costs and burdens of the
agency’s proceeding—but keeps the state’s patent interest under review. So
which is it?
STATE IMMUNITY AT THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
As I suggested in the Introduction, the states are not immune from the
PTAB’s power to institute and conduct inter partes review, among other
forms of post-grant patent review.58 This conclusion accords both with the
Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence, as well as with
prudential sovereign immunity policy. I begin with the doctrine. First, the
Court has explained that state sovereign immunity operates primarily as a
limit on the federal government’s “judicial power” under Article III of the
Constitution. But the PTAB’s lawfulness hinges on the fact that it does not
exercise any such judicial power.59 Second, though state immunity may also
apply outside Article III contexts, such penumbral immunity from agency
process is limited to proceedings that closely resemble an ordinary lawsuit.

56. Ericsson Inc., 2017 WL 6517563, at *7 (Bisk, A.P.J., concurring).
57. Id. at *5–6 (Bisk, A.P.J., concurring).
58. Portions of this section are adapted, with permission, from an amicus brief that I co-authored
and filed with Mark Lemley on behalf of a group of intellectual property law professors. See Brief Amici
Curiae of Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Appellees, Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI
Corp., No. 2018-1559 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 2018).
59. See Oil States Energy Serv. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373–75 (2018).
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But inter partes review differs from ordinary patent litigation in several
significant, relevant respects.60 Third, the nature of the proceeding and the
character of the right both inform the scope of a state’s immunity from
federal process. Here, the public right character of a patent confirms the
federal government’s power to institute review in order to check the
lawfulness of the state’s patent.
Sovereign Immunity from the Federal Judicial Power
As the Florida Prepaid decisions (along with several other of the
Supreme Court’s state sovereign immunity opinions) confirm, the judicial
power of the United States cannot be exercised against unconsenting states.61
That is, “the jurisdictional heads of Article III” remain subject to “the
sovereign immunity that the [s]tates possessed before entering the Union.”62
This is because the Supreme Court has understood the Constitution’s
Eleventh Amendment as restoring the Founders’ view—temporarily upset
by its decision in Chisholm v. Georgia—that each state, as its own sovereign
entity, is not “amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.”63
The states’ sovereign immunity, reified in the Constitution’s Eleventh
Amendment, is thus principally a limit on the federal government’s judicial
power. As a result, states may not, as noted above, be haled into federal court
to face patent litigation.
And while the states’ immunity is principally a limit on the federal
government’s judicial power, the Supreme Court has made clear that the
Patent Office does not exercise this power when it revisits a decision to grant
a patent application.64 This is because “Congress cannot confer the
government’s judicial power on entities outside of Article III.” 65 That is, inter
partes review is constitutional precisely because it does not involve an
exercise of Article III power. Hence, the power of the PTAB is not subject
to strictly the same limits as apply to the federal judicial power. Rather, any
state immunity from the PTAB’s jurisdiction must begin with another theory.
60. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016); see also Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1326–29 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
61. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
62. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669–670
(1999).
63. Hans v. La., 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton)). But see
Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 102–06, 142–50 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the Framers
and their contemporaries did not agree about the place of common-law state sovereign immunity”).
64. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373–75.
65. Id. at 1372–73.
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Penumbral Immunity from Agency Process
Though the states’ sovereign immunity operates principally as a limit
on the federal government’s judicial power—that immunity has certain
further penumbras.66 Among them is immunity from certain agency
proceedings.67 Specifically, states may be immune from nonjudicial
proceedings that nevertheless “walk[], talk[], and squawk[] very much like a
lawsuit.”68 That is, the states may not be compelled to submit to a “type of
proceedin[g]” that would offend their sovereign dignity.69
To determine whether an administrative proceeding sufficiently looks
like ordinary litigation (and whether a state may consequently be immune
from that tribunal’s power), the Supreme Court, in FMC, considered several
specific, discrete aspects of the agency’s adjudication, including motion
practice, the scope of discovery, and the role of the presiding officers.70 In
nearly every relevant respect, inter partes review differs from ordinary
litigation.
Motion Practice
In FMC, the Court explained that, under its apparent look-alike test, the
states may be immune from agency proceedings whose basic motion practice
closely resembles practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.71
For example, FMC’s holding in favor of immunity is explained, at least
in part, by the fact that the agency’s proceeding is—as in ordinary
litigation—“commenced by the filing of a complaint.”72 The Federal
Maritime Commission lacked “the discretion to refuse to adjudicate
complaints brought by private parties.”73 Not so in inter partes review. In
inter partes review, it is the Patent Office—not a private complainant—that
decides whether to institute review.

66. See, e.g., Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, “Accident,” and
Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 766 n.7, 767
(2008); Helen Hershkoff, Horizontality and the “Spooky” Doctrines of American Law, 59 BUFFALO L.
REV. 455, 485–86 (2011); see also Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, No. 17-1299, 2019 WL 2078084,
at *6–9 (U.S. May 13, 2019).
67. See, e.g., William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1,
15–18 (2017).
68. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 757 (2002).
69. Id. at 751, 757.
70. Id. at 757–59.
71. See id. at 757.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 764.
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This distinction alone may settle the question of state immunity from
PTAB jurisdiction. FMC expressly affirms an agency’s power “to institute
its own administrative proceeding against a [state],” “either upon its own
initiative or upon information supplied by a private party.”74 That reflects
precisely the institution of inter partes review: A private party supplies
information to the Patent Office by way of a petition, but the Director makes
an independent, unreviewable determination whether to institute the
proceeding against the state.75 Indeed, the agency has the unreviewable
discretion to deny any petition—even petitions that seem, on their face,
reasonably likely to succeed.76
Other distinctions also set PTAB proceedings apart from patent
litigation in the federal courts. FMC, for example, considers the cadence of
required filings.77 A defendant’s response to a complaint filed in federal
court is due within 21 days—and failing to respond can lead to a default
judgment.78 But in inter partes review, a patent owner has three months (not
three weeks) to file a preliminary response to a petition—and may even
choose to waive her right to respond without facing a default judgment.79
FMC also considers whether, as under the Civil Rules, respondents may file
counterclaims.80 Yet again, PTAB process differs: Patent owners in inter
partes review may not file counterclaims. FMC likewise considers whether
putative intervenors have similar rights both under the Civil Rules and in the
agency proceeding.81 And unlike judicial process, putative petitioners may
not intervene by right into an instituted inter partes review (though the Board
may decide, in its own discretion, to join distinct petitioners).82
Discovery
FMC’s look-alike test, in addition to motion practice, also considers
similarities between the agency’s adjudication and federal litigation in the
scope of discovery: FMC’s own conclusion that a state was immune from

74. Id. at 768.
75. Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139–42 (2016).
76. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), (d), Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2139–40, and Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2018), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
77. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 757 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)).
78. See id.
79. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.120(b) (patent owner has three months to
file a response after inter partes review has been instituted).
80. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 757.
81. Id. (comparing agency rules to FED. R. CIV. P. 24).
82. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) with FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
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proceedings before the Federal Maritime Commission is based, in part, on
the Court’s view that “discovery in FMC adjudications largely mirrors
discovery in civil litigation.”83 Indeed, the relevant statutory provisions in
FMC explained that the agency’s discovery practice must, to the extent
possible, conform to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.84
But discovery in inter partes review is quite unlike discovery under the
Civil Rules.85 Rule 26 allows the parties to “obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case;” the provisions governing inter partes
review, by contrast, offer limited preliminary discovery, and additional
discovery only “in the interest of justice.”86 As the PTAB has explained, in
inter partes review, “discovery is available for the deposition of witnesses
submitting affidavits or declarations and for what is otherwise necessary in
the interest of justice. . .That is significantly different from the scope of
discovery generally available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”87
Indeed, the scope of relevant prior art in inter partes review is limited to
patents and printed publications, excluding from consideration prior public
uses and sales that would require litigation-style discovery.88
These differences in motion practice and discovery reflect Congress’s
focus on efficient and speedy adjudication.89 The gap between federal
litigation and inter partes review is meant to lead to lower costs, reduced
complexity, and shorter adjudications.90 Hence, inter partes review
proceedings are, once instituted, generally required to come to a final
decision within one year.91 By contrast, courts are not required to terminate
a case within a particular period, and the average pendency for patent
litigation is more than twice as long.92

83. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 758.
84. Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 1711(a)(1) (1994)).
85. See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., 896 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
86. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) with 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5)(B) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b).
87. Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, No. IPR2012-00001, 2013 WL 11311697, at
*3 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2013).
88. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
89. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619, 641–42, 649
(2018).
90. See Garmin Int’l, 2013 WL 8149380, at *1.
91. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).
92. See PwC, 2018 Patent Litigation Study fig. 4, http://bit.ly/PWC_2018Study (last visited Apr.
29, 2019).
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Presiding Officer
Finally, FMC’s look-alike test compares the role of an agency
proceeding’s presiding officer to that of a federal district court judge: Is “the
role of the [administrative law judge]. . .similar to that of an Article III
judge”?93 If so, then immunity may apply.
But, as with motion and discovery practice in inter partes review, the
PTAB’s administrative patent judges differ from federal district judges in
several respects. The district court judges (like some other administrative law
judges) have wide remedial discretion to issue equitable remedies, such as
injunctions, as well as the power to assign private liability and award
damages or “reparations.”94 But administrative patent judges lack this same
remedial discretion: These judges, for example, have no power to assign
private liability or assess damages. By contrast, the PTAB has the power to
issue amended patent claims95—but the district courts have no like power to
modify a patent.
Administrative patent judges differ from Article III judges in several
other respects, too. Unlike many federal district judges (as well as ordinary
administrative law judges), administrative patent judges have patent-related
expertise, and that expertise may coincide with particular technologies
related to the patents under review.96
Moreover, federal judges are often assigned by lottery, while the
Director of the Patent Office may assign administrative patent judges to
particular cases.97 And the Director has—and has exercised—the power to
add judges to panels in order to affect a review’s outcome and thereby
advance the Patent Office’s policy preferences.98 The presiding officers in
inter partes review are thus designed to be experienced patent adjudicators,
focusing on the patent claims under review, and serving, simultaneously, in
both adjudicatory and policy roles.
***
93. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 758 (2002).
94. See, e.g., id. at 759; United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1947).
95. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(d), 318(a).
96. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (“The administrative patent judges shall be persons of competent legal
knowledge and scientific ability. . . .”); see also Saurabh Vishnubhakat, When Can the Patent Office
Intervene in Its Own Cases?, 73 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 201, 211 (2018).
97. Compare Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 47
(2009), with 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). But cf. Marin K. Levy, Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals,
103 CORNELL L. REV. 65, 67 (2017) (explaining that there is “there is reason to doubt that appellate panels
are, or could be, ‘strictly random’”)
98. Vishnubhakat, supra note 96, at 225–27.
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In short, a state’s immunity from agency adjudication hinges on the
extent to which the agency’s proceedings resemble litigation in the federal
courts. In FMC, the Supreme Court concluded that South Carolina was
immune from an agency adjudication that was “overwhelming[ly]” like
litigation.99 But any similarities between inter partes review and patent
litigation fall far short of that standard: In “significant respects, inter partes
review is less like a judicial proceeding and more like a specialized agency
proceeding.”100 This is by design. Congress designed inter partes review as
a more effective substitute for inter partes reexamination (the then-existing
specialized agency process), and as a leaner alternative to federal
litigation.101 And, as noted, the Patent Office has used inter partes review to
advance, even if slowly, a patent policy agenda.
Of Sovereignty, Supremacy, and Public Rights
These congressional motives for devising inter partes review further
explain why the states are not immune from the PTAB’s jurisdiction. Unlike
patent litigation, the “basic purpos[e]” of inter partes review is to give the
Patent Office a chance to take “a second look at an earlier administrative
grant of a patent,” one that ensures “that patent monopolies are kept within
their legitimate scope.”102 This description of inter partes review reflects two
features critical to the question of state immunity. First, the proceeding is
initiated by the federal government: The Director of the Patent Office
decides, in his own discretion, whether to revisit an earlier grant in view of
some potential error.103 Second, the federal government has an ongoing
interest in ensuring that the challenged patent was properly granted.104 These
two characteristics have important implications for a state’s claim to
immunity from the PTAB’s jurisdiction.
The federal government is generally empowered to sue a state in light
of some federal interest or duty.105 The states are not immune from such a
99. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 759.
100. Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016).
101. See id. (citing, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112–98, pt. 1 (2011), at 48; S. REP. NO. 110–259 (2008), at
20); Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., 896 F.3d 1322, 1331–35 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Dyk, J.,
concurring).
102. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144.
103. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
104. Oil States Energy Serv. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1374 (2018) (explaining that
patents “are granted subject to the qualification that the [Patent Office] has ‘the authority to reexamine—
and perhaps cancel—a patent claim’ in an inter partes review” (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2131)).
105. See United States v. Tex., 143 U.S. 621, 645 (1892); United States v. Minn., 270 U.S. 181, 195
(1926).
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suit.106 In United States v. Minnesota, for example, the Court explained that
“the immunity of the state[s] is subject to the constitutional qualification that
she may be sued. . .by the United States.”107 And the Court further explained
that the federal government’s power to sue was animated by its “duty” “to
vacate [a wrongly-issued land] patent” that “prejudice[d] the interests or
rights of the United States.”108 The government could thus sue to correct
aspects of the improper land grant notwithstanding the state patentee’s
sovereign immunity from comparable private litigation—including suits by
the landowners whose property rights were adversely affected by the
erroneous grant.109
FMC confirms that this principle applies in administrative settings, too.
There, as noted above, the Supreme Court explained that the Federal
Maritime Commission, as an agent of the federal sovereign, may “institute
its own administrative proceeding against a [state],” “either upon its own
initiative or upon information supplied by a private party.”110 This power,
the Court explained, “ampl[y]” satisfied the federal government’s
constitutional interest in “uniformity in the regulation of maritime
commerce” and in “ensuring that state-run ports comply with the Shipping
Act and other valid federal rules governing ocean-borne commerce.”111
This aspect of FMC dovetails with a line of decisions affirming the
government’s power to check, via administrative process, the propriety of
federal grants to states. In Bell v. New Jersey, for example, the Court
explained that the government “does not intrude on [a state’s] sovereignty”
when it rescinds misused grant funds by way of agency proceedings.112 In
Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, the Court likewise
explained that the federal government does not violate a state’s sovereignty
when it checks for the “lawful use of federal benefits to a state by the United
States dependent upon cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly
for the general welfare.”113 In both New Jersey and Oklahoma, a state
voluntarily accepted a federal grant subject to the obligations and conditions
106. Tex., 143 U.S. at 621; see also Minn., 270 U.S. at 195; cf. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d
at 1329 (“Indian tribes may not rely on tribal sovereign immunity to bar a suit by a superior sovereign.”
(quoting Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 698 F.3d 1326, 1331 (11th Cir. 2012))).
107. Minn., 270 U.S. at 195.
108. Id.; cf. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (explaining that state immunity may give way
“to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that [federal] law”).
109. Minn., 270 U.S. at 195, 206.
110. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 768 (2002).
111. Id. at 767; see also U.S. CONST., Art III., § 2.
112. Bell v. N.J., 461 U.S. 773, 790–91 (1983).
113. Okla. v. United States Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1947).
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imposed by the federal government—including the possibility that the
federal government would rescind the grant.114 In both cases, the agency
initiated administrative proceedings to review the states’ grants.115 In both
cases, that decision was made in view of new information alerting it to the
possible “prejudice to the interests or rights of the United States.”116 And,
finally, in both cases, the government determined that it was appropriate to
rescind part of the grant.117
This process closely mirrors the Patent Office’s review of state-owned
patents.
First, the states accept federal patents—themselves “administrative
grant[s]”—subject to ongoing obligations, such as maintenance fees, as well
as “the qualification that the [Patent Office] has the authority to reexamine—
and perhaps cancel—a patent claim.”118 Indeed, it seems settled agency
practice to exercise this authority against state-owned patents and
trademarks.119
Second, it is the Patent Office that ultimately decides whether to
institute inter partes review. As I described above, the Patent Office’s
discretion to institute review suggests that the proceeding is brought by the
federal government: A private party may petition the agency for the review,
supplying new information that casts doubt on a patent’s validity—but the
agency ultimately makes an independent and unreviewable decision whether
to institute review.120 And, as Minnesota, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and FMC
all confirm, the federal government retains the power to so move against a
state in view of a federal interest.121
Moreover, the Patent Office’s decision to review a state-owned patent
is indeed made in view of “the interests or rights of the United States,”
namely, “the public’s paramount interest that patent monopolies are kept

114. N.J., 461 U.S. at 790–91; Okla., 330 U.S. at 136.
115. N.J., 461 U.S. at 777; Okla., 330 U.S. at 133.
116. United States v. Minn., 270 U.S. 181, 195 (1926); see N.J., 461 U.S. at 777; Okla., 330 U.S. at
131–32.
117. N.J., 461 U.S. at 790–91; Okla., 330 U.S. at 133.
118. Oil States Energy Serv. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1374, 1376 n.3 (2018).
119. For patents, see, e.g., USV Limited v. State of Or., No. 2009-005002, 2009 WL 2807855, at *1
(B.P.A.I. Aug. 31, 2009). For trademarks, see, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Phoenix
Int’l Software, 653 F.3d 448, 451 (7th Cir. 2011) (appeal regarding Phoenix Software Int’l v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., No. 92042881 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 26, 2007)).
120. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
121. See, respectively, Minn., 270 U.S. at 195; N.J., 461 U.S. at 777; Okla., 330 U.S. at 131–32; Fed.
Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 767–68 (2002).
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within their legitimate scope.”122 The Supreme Court’s decision in Oil States
explains that patents are public rights—rights that “arise between the
[federal] Government and persons” (or, it would seem, states) “subject to its
authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions
of the executive or legislative departments,” including the Constitution’s
Intellectual Property Clause.123 This public right character of a patent—a
federal grant that takes “immense value” from the national public and, in the
case of a state-owned patent, awards it to a single state—confirms the
government’s ongoing interest in the lawfulness of the patent examiner’s
initial decision.124 Hence, because inter partes review is “designed to end
[the] continuing violation of federal law” wrought by a wrongly-issued
patent, the Patent Office may review a state-owned patent, state immunity
notwithstanding, “to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy
of that law.”125 It is this underlying patent policy interest that animates the
Director’s power to review a state-owned patent.
Finally, the PTAB may, in such a review, affirm the examiner’s
decision, or it may decide to grant amended claims,126 or it may cancel the
improperly granted patent’s claims altogether.127
122. See, respectively, Minn., 270 U.S. at 195 and Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374 (quoting Cuozzo
Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)). Moreover, that inter partes review vindicates the
public interests of the United States is further confirmed by 35 U.S.C. § 317(a) (which authorizes the
Patent Office to carry a review to a final decision even when no petitioner remains in the process), and
by the Patent Office’s own rules (which allow it to continue review even absent the patent owner’s
participation). See also Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144; Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., 896
F.3d 1322, 1328 (“IPR is an act by the agency in reconsidering its own grant of a public franchise.”).
123. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
To be sure, the states’ immunity “is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when [a matter] is an area
. . .that is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517
U.S. 44, 74 (1996). And so Congress may not rely on its constitutional authority over intellectual property
law to abrogate the states’ immunity from certain private claims. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635–36 (1999). But the Supreme Court’s other sovereign
immunity decisions suggest that states are not immune from private actions seeking prospective relief,
such as a declaration of invalidity. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“Both prospective and
retrospective relief implicate Eleventh Amendment concerns, but the availability of prospective
relief. . .gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal
law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law.”); Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56, 59–60 (1908). But see supra note 35 and accompanying text (citing Tegic
Commc’ns Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). This
is doubly so for invalidity actions—administrative or judicial—brought by the federal government. See
supra note 121 and accompanying text.
124. See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373–74, 1376 n.3 (noting the Patent Office’s “continuing authority
to review and potentially cancel patents after they are issued”).
125. See Green, 474 U.S. at 69.
126. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(d)(1), 316(d)(3), 318(a).
127. See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374. Any decision to cancel a patent claim must be made under
specified, existing statutory criteria, namely, 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
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In sum, the federal government has, in court and through agency
processes, repeatedly exercised continuing jurisdiction over public grants—
including grants to the states—to ensure that they remain within lawful
bounds. So too with inter partes review: Two features of inter partes
review—the character of the proceeding as one instituted by the federal
government, and the character of the patent as a public right—confirm the
inapplicability of state immunity. The power of the federal government to
review a state-owned patent inheres in the federal government’s status as the
superior sovereign.128 And the susceptibility of a state-owned patent to such
federal agency scrutiny inheres in the patent’s status as a public right.129 The
PTAB may thus exercise its discretion to institute review of a state-owned
patent where it believes that the patent may have been incorrectly granted—
that is, where the patent unlawfully takes substantial value from the national
public and reallocates it to a single state. This power accords with the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the scope of the states’ sovereignty
vis-à-vis the power of the federal government: Agencies may initiate
administrative processes to review federal grants to the states in order to
ensure they remain within lawful bounds.
A POLICY BALANCE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PATENTEES
Such review helps the Patent Office take care that patentees—states and
private parties alike—receive only valid patent claims.130 Indeed, several
notable commentators have emphasized the importance of preserving “fair
relationships” among the states and their private counterparts in light of the
apparent advantages that sovereign immunity confers.131
In litigation settings, for example, states have been accused of “stopping
private entities from bringing declaratory judgment actions to challenge the
validity of [a state-owned] patent” in fundamentally unfair ways, and thereby
128. See supra note 121 and accompanying text; see also United States ex rel. Milam v. Univ. of
Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1992); McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Sec’y of State
(In re McVey Trucking, Inc.), 812 F.2d 311, 322 (7th Cir. 1987).
129. See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373–74, 1376 n.3 (noting the Patent Office’s “continuing authority
to review and potentially cancel patents after they are issued”); Green, 474 U.S. at 69 (“Remedies
designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in
assuring the supremacy of that law.”). But cf. supra note 123.
130. See Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139–40 (2016).
131. See Xechem Int’l v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (Newman, J., additional views); see also Biomedical Patent Mgmt. v. Cal. Department of Health
Serv., No. C 06-00737 MHP, 2006 WL 1530177, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006); Xechem Int’l v. Univ.
of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., No. Civ. A. H-02-1013, 2003 WL 24232747, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
19, 2003).
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“threaten[ing] the ability of others from advancing needed research,
technology and medical innovation.”132 Indeed, some evidence suggests that
the states, secure from the threat of such validity challenges in federal court,
have been able to “become more aggressive licensors of their patents.”133
But this security from judicial process, “based primarily on present-day
assumptions about the status of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the
18th century,” does not account for the states’ many modern roles.134 These
“[s]overeigns did not then play the kind of role in the commercial
marketplace that they do today.”135 And so these ancient conceptions of
sovereign immunity do not consider the consequences of modern sovereign
market participation.
But other, more recent incarnations of analogous immunity do.
Congress, in passing and amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
has excepted certain sovereign commercial activity from the scope of foreign
sovereign immunity.136 Moreover, in the context of federal sovereign
immunity, the Supreme Court unanimously explained that private “suit[s]
challenging a commercial act will not gravely—or, indeed, at all—interfere
with the governmental functions” that immunity is meant to protect.137
These fairness and competition concerns apply with equal force to state
sovereign immunity.138 As judges, scholars, and commentators have all
remarked, there is little reason that, say, the University of California or the
University of Wisconsin should enjoy advantages vis-à-vis similarly situated
private universities. And there is likewise little reason to grant protections to
state-owned enterprises that are not extended to their private competitors.139
Indeed, state immunity distorts patent and patent-related markets, conferring
important advantages on select parties for reasons that have nothing to with
innovation policy.

132. Makan Delrahim, Patently Unfair, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Apr. 25, 2008),
http://bit.ly/MD_NatRev.
133. See Narechania, supra note 4, at 1602.
134. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 692 (1999)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); see also Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 691–92, 692 n.1 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (describing the FSIA’s commercial activity exception); id. at 699 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(similar).
137. Cf. Thacker v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 139 S. Ct. 1435, 1442–43 (2019).
138. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Phoenix Int’l Software, 653 F.3d 448, 477 (7th Cir.
2011); see Narechania, supra note 4, at 1575 n.3–5.
139. See, e.g., Narechania, supra note 4, at 1575 n.3–5; Biomedical Patent Mgmt. v. Cal. Dep’t of
Health Serv., No. C 06-00737 MHP, 2006 WL 1530177, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006).
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Of course, the Supreme Court has, to date, rejected any analogous
market participation exception for state sovereign immunity,140 explaining
that the “preeminent purpose” of state immunity is to protect the states’
dignitary interests rather than their fiscal ones.141 But when a state engages
in commercial activity, there are fewer—if any—sovereign dignitary
concerns at stake.142 And any such dignitary interests cannot prevent the
federal sovereign from bringing its own action against a state to protect
federal concerns.143 Inter partes review thus helps to restore some balance
between state and private patentees. State and private patentees both may
rely on their patents to generate revenue—and, likewise, state and private
patentees both may have their patents double-checked by the Patent Office
to ensure that those patents conform to statutory limits. In accord with the
government’s authority to revoke or amend an administrative grant through
agency process,144 Congress has designed a limited and unique agency
proceeding that advances the public’s interest in balance between incentives
for original inventions and access to, say, obvious improvements to existing
technologies. That interest does not vary across state and private patentees.
CONCLUSION
In a series of recent decisions, different members of the PTAB have
advanced at least four different theories of states immunity. In some cases,
the PTAB has suggested that the states are absolutely immune. In others, the
PTAB has held the state immune from the Board’s jurisdiction—but
nevertheless kept the state’s patent under review. Other cases suggest that a
state’s immunity is contingent on its conduct in other fora. And other
opinions suggest that immunity should never apply. So which view is
correct?
As a matter of doctrine and policy, state sovereign immunity does not
apply at the PTAB. For one, any immunity from the “judicial power” of the
United States does not apply in Article II courts. And to the extent that this
immunity extends to agency proceedings that look like litigation, inter partes
review is, in “significant respects. . .less like a judicial proceeding and more
like a specialized agency proceeding.”145 And finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the states’ sovereign immunity does not apply in proceedings
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 685–86, 686 n.4.
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760, 765 (2002).
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 768.
Oil States Energy Serv. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1375 (2018).
Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016).
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instituted by the federal government to protect an important federal interest.
Moreover, the federal government’s power to check the scope of state-owned
patents helps to assure an ongoing balance between public and private
patentees.

